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1. Introduction 
The vast majority of firms around the world fall into the category of micro, small or 
medium-sized enterprises.  In terms of enterprises, more than 95% fall into this category; but 
even in terms of employment in low and lower-middle income countries, more than 50% of 
employees work in companies with fewer than 100 employees (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2011a). While SMEs thus constitute an important component of the private 
sector in the developing world, they report significantly higher obstacles to their operation 
and growth than large enterprises (Beck et al., 2006a).  Among these obstacles, the lack of 
access to appropriate financial services, especially lending services, looms large.  
Africa’s financial systems are small, shallow and costly, with limited outreach. This is 
not just reflected in aggregate financial development indicators but also in firm- and 
household data gauging the use of formal financial services (Beck and Cull, 2014). However, 
financial systems in Africa have also seen dramatic changes over the past two decades, in 
market structure and stability. And there are enormous differences across the region, ranging 
from well-developed financial systems in middle-income countries, such as Mauritius and 
South Africa, to shallow banking systems offering only the most rudimentary financial 
services in impoverished countries like Central African Republic and South Sudan.    
This paper surveys the state of SME Finance in Sub-Saharan Africa.  We use 
Enterprise Survey data from the World Bank to explore cross-country and cross-firm 
variation in the use of financial services. We document lower use of financial services by 
firms inside than outside Africa and of smaller and younger firms.  We use regression 
analysis to relate firms’ access to finance to an array of firm and country characteristics and 
gauge whether these relationships are different inside and outside Africa.   We also discuss 
several persistent and new challenges for SME Finance in Africa.  
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While a large literature has established a positive impact of financial deepening on 
economic growth and poverty alleviation, especially and foremost in developing countries 
(Levine, 2005), recent evidence using firm-level data has pointed to SME finance as an 
important channel. The literature has identified different channels through which financial 
development affects firm and, ultimately, aggregate growth. First, the availability of external 
finance is positively associated with the number of start-ups—an important indicator of 
entrepreneurship—as well as with firm dynamism and innovation (e.g., Aghion, Fally and 
Scarpetta, 2007; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2011b). Second, finance allows 
existing firms to exploit growth and investment opportunities, and to achieve larger 
equilibrium size (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006b). Finally, firms can 
safely acquire a more efficient productive asset portfolio where the infrastructure of finance 
is in place, and they are also able to choose more efficient organizational forms such as 
incorporation (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt, Love and Maksimovic, 2006).  
This paper also relates to a large literature on firms’ financing obstacles. Following a 
seminal paper by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), a large body of empirical literature 
has emerged to estimate financing constraints of firms.1  A firm is typically defined to be 
financially constrained if a windfall increase in the supply of internal funds results in a higher 
level of investment spending. This literature has mostly applied balance sheet data.  Beck et 
al. (2006a), on the other hand, use firm-level survey data and find that older, larger, and 
foreign-owned firms report fewer financing obstacles.  A growing literature has been using 
firm-survey data to explore country covariates of access to credit and firms’ financing 
constraints, focusing, among others, on foreign bank entry (Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria, 
2006), legal system efficiency (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2005) and regulatory 
frameworks (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006c). 
                                                          
1
 See Schiantarelli (1995) and Hubbard (1998) for surveys. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides descriptive 
evidence on firms’ access to financial services inside and outside Africa, the size gap in 
corporate finance and the importance of financing constraints. Section 3 presents regression 
analysis to gauge firm and country covariates of access to credit and differential effects inside 
and outside Africa.   Section 4 discusses policy challenges for SME finance in Africa and 
section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Enterprise access to finance in international comparison 
The Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank Group allow a detailed exploration of 
variation in the use of financial services across firms with different characteristics. These 
surveys have been conducted over the past 10 years in over 100 countries with standardized 
survey instruments and a uniform sampling methodology. 2 The surveys try to capture 
business perceptions of the most important obstacles to enterprise operation and growth, but 
also include detailed information on companies’ management and financing arrangements. 
Sample sizes vary between 250 and 1,500 companies per country and data are collected using 
either simple random or randomly stratified sampling.  The sample includes formal 
enterprises of all sizes, different age groups, and different ownership types in manufacturing, 
construction, services, and transportation.  Firms from different locations, such as the capital 
city, major cities, and small towns, are included. 
Figure 1 shows that the use of bank loans in Sub-Saharan Africa is lower than in other 
developing regions of the world. 3 Across all three size groups (defined by the number of 
employees), enterprises within Africa are less likely to have a loan than those outside Africa, 
                                                          
2
 See www.enterpriseseurveys.org for more details. Similar surveys were previously conducted under the 
leadership of the World Bank and other IFIs in Africa (Regional Project on Enterprise Development), the 
Central and Eastern European transition economies (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Surveys) in the 1990s, and world-wide in 2000 (World Business Environment Survey).  
3
 Please note that in the following, we will use the expressions Africa and Sub-Saharan African interchangeably.  
We do not include North African countries in our analysis.  
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with large firms in Africa even less likely to have a loan than mid-sized firms outside Africa.  
In terms of having access to checking or saving account facilities, on the other hand, there is 
no significant difference between enterprises inside and outside Africa and only a small gap 
between small, mid-sized and large enterprises.   
Figure 1: Use of formal account and loan services across firm size groups in 
international comparison 
 
This graph shows the share of firms with a bank loan and a bank account across three size groups: small (fewer 
than 20 employees), medium (20 to 99 employees) and large enterprises (100 and more employees). Source: 
authors’ calculations based on Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
 
There is not only a gap in the use of lending services across firms of different sizes 
but also across firms of different ages, as illustrated in Figure 2. Older firms, defined as firms 
with more than 15 years of operation, are more likely to have a loan than firms with between 
6 and 15 years of operation, which are in turn more likely to have a loan than enterprises with 
five or less years of operation.   While these comparisons between African and non-African 
countries are illustrative, they do not control for other factors varying across countries.  We 
will provide a more rigorous analysis in the next section.   
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Figure 2: Use of formal account and loan services across firm age groups in 
international comparison 
 
This graph shows the share of firms with a bank loan and a bank account across three age groups: young firms 
(five years or less since establishment), medium (6 to 15 years since establishment) and old (over 15 years since 
establishment). Source: authors’ calculations based on Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
 
While these two figures suggest an Africa factor in the access to external finance by 
enterprises, there is also a large within-regional variation across countries.  While only three 
percent of enterprises in Guinea-Bissau have a formal loan, 53 percent do so in Mauritius. 
Many of the financially more developed economies also have a larger share of enterprises 
with a loan, although the relationship is not linear and there are many outliers. For example, 
in South Africa, often seen as one of, if not the, most developed financial systems on the 
continent, 34 percent of enterprises have a formal bank loan, while in Burundi, with a 
rudimentary banking system and a history of civil conflict, 35 percent have a formal bank 
loan.  While the difference between the share of large and the share of small enterprises with 
a formal bank loan is 64 percent in Angola, it is close to zero in Eritrea. It is interesting to 
note that there is no significant correlation between the large-small enterprise gap and the 
overall share of enterprises with a formal bank loan across African countries.  
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Given the limited access to bank loans in Africa, it is not surprising that African 
enterprises are more likely to rate access to finance as the most important constraint to their 
operation and growth than enterprises outside Africa (Figure 3). More than 25 percent of 
firms in Africa rate availability and cost of finance as the most important obstacle, almost 
twice as many as outside Africa. Finance is also the most cited obstacle.  As shown in 
previous work, access to finance is not only a self-reported obstacle, but turns into a growth 
constraint, especially for smaller firms and in more shallow financial markets (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005) and is more binding than other constraints 
(Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Obstacles to Firms’ Operation and Growth in International Comparison 
 
This graph shows the growth obstacle noted as the most important one by firms in countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and outside Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: authors’ calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
 
Enterprise survey data also allow an exploration of the reasons why enterprises do not 
have loans with formal financial institutions.  Specifically, enterprises are asked for the 
reason that they did not apply for a loan with a formal financial institution over the past year.  
Table 1 shows the share of enterprises that quote lack of demand is significantly lower in 
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Africa (43%) than in other developing countries (62%), suggesting that lack of demand is a 
less important factor in Africa than elsewhere. High interest rates were also mentioned as a 
reason for not applying for loans (14% in Africa vs. 10% in other developing countries), 
which can have two interpretations. On the one hand, the return on investment projects could 
be too low in Africa.  On the other hand, and as noted by many observers of African finance, 
the high cost of credit might impede the use of bank finance. As discussed above, interest rate 
spreads and thus lending rates are significantly higher in Africa than in non-African 
developing countries, which suggest that high costs are indeed a valid explanation for why 
credit is limited in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Those high costs of credit can also be explained not 
only by the lack of competition noted above, but also by monetary and socio-political 
instability resulting in high risk premia.  
The importance of monetary and socio-political stability can be appreciated when 
considering that the share of non-applicants due to high interest rates is especially high in 
DRC and Zimbabwe. Even more striking is the difference in the share of respondents 
indicating that application procedures are the reason for not applying:   16% of non-applicant 
enterprises in Africa as opposed to 7% in other developing countries. Collateral requirements 
also seem to be more of an impediment in Africa than in other regions of the developing 
world (9% vs. 4%), as is the need for bribes (4% vs. 2%).  These data point to a large array of 
barriers both on the macroeconomic but also the bank-specific level for enterprises in Africa 
to access formal sources of external finance. 
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Table 1: Why do firms not apply for loans? 
This table reports the share of firms in low- and lower-middle income countries in and outside Africa (i) that 
indicate they have a loan; in case they do not if (ii) they applied for a loan over the past year; and if they did not, 
(iii) the reason of why they did not.  Source: authors’ calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
 
How does the limited access of SMEs in Africa relate to the shallow financial markets 
documented in the literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2011; Beck and Cull, 2014)? Figure 4 plots the 
share of small firms with a formal bank loan against the total bank lending to the private 
sector relative to GDP, a standard indicator from the finance and growth literature.  African 
countries are noted with their respective country codes.  Figure 4 shows that while there is a 
positive correlation between financial depth and the share of small firms with a formal bank 
loan, almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are below the regression line. That is, there 
are fewer small African firms with a formal loan than would be predicted by aggregate credit 
numbers.  
 
 
 
 
Do you have a loan? 
yes no
low/lower-middle-income countries Africa 16.52 83.48
low/lower-middle income countries ROW 28.64 71.36
Did you apply for a loan? 
Region yes no
Africa 27.76 72.24
Rest of the World 30.56 69.44
Why did 
you not 
apply?
Africa Rest of the world
43.24 62.22
15.91 7.05
14.03 10.27
9.01 4.28
2.05 1.15
3.77 2.02
7.76 7.10
 no need for a loan
application procedures are complex
interest rates are not favorable
collateral requirements are too high
size of loan or maturity are insufficient
necessary to make informal payments to get 
did not think it would be approved
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Figure 4: Financial Depth vs. Outreach across the World 
 
This graph shows the correlation between the Bank Credit to GDP and the share of small firms with a bank 
credit across countries. Source: authors’ calculations based on Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org) 
and the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Indicators.  
 
 
3. What explains access to finance by SMEs in Africa and elsewhere? 
This section explores the covariates of the likelihood of having a loan from a formal 
financial institution.  While the graphs in the previous section have shown that larger and 
older firms are more likely to have a formal loan and have provided evidence for an African 
gap in the use of finance by SMEs, firm size and age might be correlated with other firm 
characteristics and the “Africa gap” in corporate finance might reflect the variation in the 
composition of the firm population. The following regression analysis will allow us to isolate 
the firm characteristics that can explain the use of formal bank loans, gauge the existence of 
an African gap and assess whether the relationship between firm characteristics and access to 
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bank loans varies across firms inside and outside Africa.  
 
A. Data and Methodology 
We use an enterprise-level dummy variable from the Enterprise Surveys indicating whether a 
firm has a loan as the dependent variable in probit regressions that include an array of firm 
characteristics as well as country- and sector-specific variables. Specifically, we use the 
following probit regression, reporting marginal effects to gauge not only the statistical but 
also economic significance: 
Loani = α + β1 FIRMi + β2 SECTORi + β3 BANKINGj + εij   (1) 
where Loan is the aforementioned dummy variable and FIRM represents a set of variables 
that capture enterprise characteristics including size (small, medium, large), age, and 
ownership type (foreign, government, or private domestic). In line with the existing literature 
and the Figures in the previous section, we expect that larger and older firms are more likely 
to report that they have a loan. In the regressions that follow, large firm size is the omitted 
category and so we expect the coefficients for small and medium-sized firms to be negative 
and significant. We have less strong priors about the ownership variables. Government-
owned firms might have greater access to loans in countries with state-dominated financial 
systems, but private domestic firms might have better investment projects and thus greater 
need for credit. Foreign firms might rely more heavily on alternative sources of funding, such 
as from their parent company, than on credit. Private domestic ownership is the omitted 
category in the regressions that follow. Again, we lack strong expectations about the sign of 
the coefficients for foreign and government ownership. 
 The firm-level characteristics also include a dummy variable indicating whether the 
principal owner of the enterprise is female, which we expect to have a negative coefficient 
based on the literature (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Singer, 2013). We also include dummy 
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variables describing each firm’s organizational type (sole proprietorship, partnership, 
privately owned but not a sole proprietorship or partnership, and publicly traded). We expect 
that simpler organizational forms, such as sole proprietorships, might find it more difficult to 
establish credit histories and amass collateral that would enable them to borrow from external 
sources. However, publicly traded firms have access to capital markets, and thus might rely 
less on external credit despite greater organizational complexity than other ownership forms. 
The omitted organizational form is a category called “other” for firms that were not classified 
into one of the four types described above. 
For models that include only firm-level characteristics as explanatory variables, we 
include country- and sector- fixed effects.  We also cluster error terms at the country level to 
allow for correlation of error terms within but not across countries. In a second set of 
regressions, we replace country dummies with a dummy variable for countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa to gauge whether there is a systematic difference in firms’ access to external 
finance in- and outside the region.  In a third step we include two country characteristics - the 
log of GNI per capita and population density – as explanatory variables. Richer economies 
typically have more developed financial systems and Allen et al. (2012) show the importance 
of low population density in explaining shallow financial markets in Africa.  Finally, we 
interact the firm-level characteristics with a dummy for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
gauge whether there are differences in the extent to which firm characteristics co-vary with 
the use of formal lending services in Sub-Saharan Africa relative to other developing regions.  
In this last set of regressions, we also include the dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa by 
itself.  
A second part of the analysis incorporates banking sector characteristics as regressors 
to test whether specific features of African banking systems can account for the low levels of 
credit usage. Where reliable credit histories and collateral registries are underdeveloped, as in 
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much of Africa, banks must rely on alternative methods to manage credit risk and ensure 
repayment, and some types of banking systems may be better at this than others. For 
example, where credit registries do not exist, information about existing borrowers is 
exchanged informally among bank executives, which is, obviously, only feasible in small and 
concentrated banking systems with old-boys networks that in turn strengthen the oligopolistic 
nature of such banking systems. There is also a tendency towards personal and bank 
guarantees where real estate and mobile assets cannot serve as collateral.    Long relationships 
between a financial institution, or even a specific loan officer, and the borrower can help 
overcome problems of information asymmetry and thus risk (Berger and Udell, 1995).  
Recently, a more nuanced view has been put forward that large and foreign banks could have 
an advantage relative to other institutions in financing SMEs through arms-length lending 
technologies, such as asset-based lending, factoring, leasing, fixed-asset lending, credit 
scoring, and centralized organizational structures (see Berger and Udell, 2006 and De la 
Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2010). 
The debate on relationship vs. transaction based lending techniques also has 
implications for which institutions can cater cost-effectively to SMEs.  Relationship lending 
might be better done by small, community based financial institutions, while transaction-
based lending is more cost-effectively done by large financial institutions that can exploit the 
necessary scale economies that investment in technology implies. In many developing 
countries, this debate has an additional dimension, as smaller banks are often owned by 
domestic shareholders, while large financial institutions are often foreign-owned.   Using data 
for 91 banks across 45 countries, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2011) find that 
foreign banks are more likely to use transaction-based lending techniques and more 
centralized business models than domestic banks. However, they also show that foreign 
banks do not tend to lend less to SMEs than other banks. Beck, Ioannidou and Schäfer (2012) 
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show for Bolivia that foreign and domestic banks do indeed cater partly to the same clientele, 
but with different lending techniques; foreign banks’ lending depends, however, on the 
existence of credit registries and effective collateral protection, an observation confirmed 
using cross-country analysis (Claessens and van Horen, 2014). It thus seems that both 
relationship and transaction-based lending techniques can be appropriate for SME lending 
and that both domestic and foreign-owned banks can cater to SMEs. 
We therefore include in the regressions six banking sector variables that proxy for the 
prevalence of the alternative lending methods used by different types of banks.  First, we 
include branch penetration per capita to capture the geographic outreach of the banking 
system, a pre-condition for relationship-based lending.4  Next, we include two variables that 
measure the shares of banking sector assets held by majority-foreign and majority-
government owned banks, respectively. The omitted category in these regressions is therefore 
the share of banking assets held by private domestically owned banks. If the transaction-
based lending techniques favored by foreign banks have expanded access to credit, we would 
expect a positive coefficient for the foreign bank asset share variable. At the same time, 
despite strong foreign bank presence in Africa, it seems more likely to us that the relationship 
lending methods practiced by private domestic banks remain more prevalent than the 
transaction-based methods, in which case foreign-owned bank share would have a negative 
coefficient. There is, in fact, some cross-country evidence supportive of a negative 
relationship between foreign bank presence and credit usage (Detragiache, Tressel, and 
Gupta, 2008). For the share of assets held by government banks, it has been argued that state-
owned banks can promote wider access to credit, though supporting empirical evidence is 
difficult to come by (Cull and Martinez Peria, 2010). Moreover, after the wave of divestiture 
by African governments in the 1990s and early 2000s, fewer large state-owned banks exist, 
                                                          
4
 We also considered alternative outreach indicators, including the number of loan accounts, but most of those 
had limited cross-country coverage.  
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and thus we would expect no strong relationship between government banks’ asset shares and 
usage of credit. 
A fourth banking sector variable is the share of assets held by the three largest banks 
in each country. We use this as a proxy for the prevalence of large banks that can potentially 
exploit the necessary scale economies to undertake transaction-based lending. At the same 
time, sector concentration could merely reflect a less competitive lending environment, and 
the extent to which large banks are currently pursuing transaction lending to previously 
underserved market segments is unknown, and so the coefficient for this variable could be 
either negative or positive. Finally, we include two variables that measure banking sector 
efficiency: the ratio of overhead costs to total banking assets and the net interest margin. 
Relationship lending is typically more costly per dollar lent than transaction-based 
approaches, which is reflected in higher interest margins. These variables can therefore be 
seen as proxies for the prevalence of relationship lending. Depending on whether relationship 
or transactions-based approaches are more effective at expanding credit usage, the 
coefficients for these variables could be positive or negative. At the same time, within Africa, 
it could be that relationship lending is far less efficiently pursued than in other regions, and 
that transaction-based approaches have been slow to take off. A negative coefficient for the 
overheads and interest margins variables would therefore be interpreted as a reflection of low 
credit usage stemming from an inefficient banking system. 
The models that include country-level banking variables are similar to those that 
include only firm-level characteristics as explanatory variables in many respects. Both 
include sector fixed effects and error terms are clustered at the country level to allow for 
correlation of error terms across firms within a country. We also interact the firm-level 
characteristics with a dummy for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to gauge whether there are 
differences in the extent to which those variables co-vary with the use of formal lending 
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services in Sub-Saharan Africa relative to other developing regions. One key difference, 
however, is that the models that incorporate banking variables cannot include country fixed 
effects because those variables tend to be time-invariant. 
In a final set of regressions, we interact the banking variables with firm characteristics 
to test whether specific features of banking systems are associated with reduced credit usage 
for certain types of firms. For example, concentrated financial systems might imply less 
credit usage among informationally opaque small firms. We conclude by allowing those 
interactions to have different coefficients for Africa than for the rest of the developing world. 
This enables us to test whether relationships between banking characteristics, firm 
characteristics, and credit usage are less (or more) pronounced in Africa.  
 
 
B. Regression Results  
The results in Table 2 indicate that smaller firms are around 30 percent and medium-
size firms 13 to 14 percent less likely to have a formal loan than large firms. We also find that 
foreign-owned firms are about eight percent less likely to have a formal loan, presumably 
because they have access to internal funding within the multinational enterprise. 
Government-owned firms are also less likely to use formal lending than other firms. Older 
firms are more likely to have a formal loan. There is also some evidence that firms organized 
as partnerships and sole proprietorships, the simplest organizational forms, are less likely to 
have a formal loan. All of these results for the firm characteristics variables are in line with 
the literature and our hypotheses. All columns include sectoral dummies, with error terms 
clustered at the country level to control for omitted variables leading to correlation among 
error terms.  While column 1 contains country fixed effects, we replace them in column 2 
with a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa, which enters negatively and significantly at the one 
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percent level. The coefficient estimate indicates that even after controlling for firm 
characteristics, African firms are 19 percent less likely to have a bank loan.   
In column 3, we include dummy variables for all six World Bank regions as well as 
two time-variant country variables, the log of GNI per capita and population density.  We 
find that firms in more densely populated countries are more likely to have a bank loan, while 
the income level is not significantly associated with the likelihood of having a loan. We also 
find that compared to the Latin America and Caribbean region (the omitted region), firms in  
South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, and Europe and Central Asia are less likely to 
have a bank loan, with the effect even stronger for North Africa and the Middle East than for 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The results in column 4 of Table 2 indicate that some of the firm characteristics are 
related to firms’ access to finance in a different manner within Africa than outside. Here, we 
interact the firm characteristics with the dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa to test 
whether those characteristics relate to formal credit usage differently in Africa than in other 
developing regions. Coefficients for most of the firm characteristics, which now summarize 
relationships outside Africa, are similar to those in models 1 and 2. Small-, and medium-
sized, and foreign- and government-owned firms are significantly less likely to have loans. 
The interactions for the age and firm size variables with the Africa dummy variable are 
insignificant, indicating that the same relationships hold in Africa as elsewhere. The 
interaction between the Africa dummy and foreign ownership is positive and significant, and 
of similar size as the negative coefficient for the foreign ownership variable. This suggests 
that foreign ownership reduces the likelihood of having a formal loan, though this effect is 
not significant in Africa as indicated by the p-value for the sum of the two coefficients at the 
bottom of the table.  While privately owned firms (that are not sole proprietors or 
partnerships) are more likely to have access to external finance outside Africa, they are less 
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likely to have access to external finance in Africa as the sum of the positive level and 
negative interaction effects is negative (though insignificant).  Sole proprietorships are less 
likely to have access to external finance in- and outside Africa, with the effect being stronger 
in Africa, as indicated by the negative and significant interaction term.  
While the female manager dummy does not enter significantly by itself, its interaction 
with the Africa dummy enters positively and significantly.   P-values at the bottom of the 
table show that the sum of the female manager coefficient and its interaction with Africa is 
significantly greater than zero, indicating that female-managed firms are also more likely to 
have credit than male-managed firms in Sub-Saharan Africa.  These findings are somewhat 
consistent with results documented by Aterido, Beck and Iacovone (2013) using the same 
data source for African countries, who did not find any significant relationship between 
female ownership or management and access to credit.  They explain their findings with 
differences in key characteristics and a potential selection bias – enterprises with female 
ownership participation are smaller and younger, and female entrepreneurs are less likely to 
run sole proprietorships than men. Furthermore, such firms are more likely to innovate and 
more prevalent in sectors that tend to rely less on access to external finance. 
 The results in Table 3 show a negative relationship between banking system 
inefficiency and firms’ access to external finance.   Here we include, one by one, six different 
indicators of banking system development.  We do not find any significant relationship 
between firms’ access to external finance and branch penetration, ownership structure or 
concentration of banking systems.  We find negative and significant coefficients on both 
indicators of banking system inefficiency, overhead costs to total assets and the net interest 
margin. In line with our discussion above and noting the high overhead costs and net interest 
margins across Africa, these results suggest that (i) inefficient banking systems reduce access 
of African firms to external finance and (ii) relationship lending is still used across most of 
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Africa and the resulting high costs are related to limited access to external finance by 
enterprises.  Our previous findings on firm characteristics and their interaction with the 
Africa dummy and the two other country characteristics (average income level and 
population density) are confirmed in Table 3.   
 In our final set of regressions in Table 4, we include interactions between banking 
variables and firm size and we allow their effects to differ for African firms. This enables us 
to examine whether specific banking sector characteristics have differential relationships with 
the credit usage of small and medium-sized firms in Africa.   All models in Table 4 control 
for the same firm characteristics (and their interactions with the Africa dummy variable) as in 
Tables 2 and 3, though we do not show all of those coefficients to conserve space. As only 
overhead costs to total assets and the net interest margin entered significantly in Table 3, we 
focus on these two variables.  The negative coefficients for small- and medium-sized firms 
are very stable in both models, as is the negative coefficient on the Africa dummy. While the 
net interest margin enters negatively and significantly, the overhead cost variable does not 
enter significantly by itself.   However, we find significant and negative interaction terms 
between the small and medium-sized firm dummies and overhead costs, indicating that bank 
inefficiency is negatively associated with SMEs’ access to external finance.  None of the 
other double interaction terms enters significantly nor the triple interaction terms between 
firm size dummies, the Africa dummy and overhead costs.  In the case of net interest margin, 
we find a positive and significant interaction term between the Africa dummy and the net 
interest margin, which is of similar size to the negative and significant coefficient on net 
interest margin.  This suggests that in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, there is no significant 
relationship between net interest margins and firms’ access to external finance, unlike in 
other developing regions of the world.  
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 In all, the regressions in this section suggest that while many of the same firm 
characteristics are associated with having formal loans in Africa as in other parts of the 
developing world, such as firm age and size, other relationships differ. Most notably, African 
female-managed firms appear to fare better in formal credit markets than both firms managed 
by females in other developing regions and those managed by African males. This could be 
because so few African firms are managed by women and those that survive are of high 
quality and because of the other selection biases described above. Firms organized as sole 
proprietorships and partnerships also appear to fare worse in Africa in formal credit markets 
than in other developing regions. On the other hand, there is no significant evidence that 
banking sector characteristics are more or less significant factors in explaining the lack of 
African firms’ access to external finance than firms in non-African developing countries.  
 
4. SME Finance in Africa – quo vadis? 
The previous section provided a snapshot of firm and country characteristics that can 
explain access to bank finance by firms in Africa. Some of these findings relate directly to 
several on-going policy debates in the SME space. We will briefly review some of these 
recent developments and debates in this section. 
A first important area, already referred to above is the lending techniques by banks in 
combination with the ownership structure of banking systems. While we did not find any 
significant relationship between foreign bank penetration and access to credit within Africa, a 
more granular view is needed.  While the share of foreign-owned banks has further increased 
over the past twenty years, the composition of the foreign bank population has changed 
significantly, with a higher share of banks from other emerging markets, including from 
within Africa (Beck et al., 2011). These banks can bring expertise from similar markets with 
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them, while having the advantage of less organizational and hierarchical distance to their 
parent banks (Mian, 2006).  
There are also specific transaction- and asset-based lending techniques that can be 
useful for catering to smaller and informationally more opaque companies. Leasing can be a 
prominent instrument for SME financing, especially for Africa. First, collateral requirements 
have been well documented as one of the main impediments that prevent African SMEs from 
accessing traditional forms of financing needed to acquire machinery and equipment. Leasing 
is asset-backed and its applications are often assessed based on the project’s capacity to 
service lease payments. Accordingly, businesses and entrepreneurs that are denied traditional 
banking and commercial credit due to their lack of credit history and inability to provide 
sufficient guarantees can find a new financing alternative in the leasing market.  This can also 
bring more businesses into the formal sector. Second, unlike bank credit, leasing directly 
provides the asset instead of financial resources needed to acquire it, which reduces the 
possibility to divert funds from their intended purposes. Leasing contracts involve less 
paperwork and more relaxed credit requirements as well, which leads to shorter waiting 
periods than for bank loans.  
Similarly, factoring, the discounting of sales receivables, is attractive for small 
suppliers of large credit-worthy buyers, as it does not rely on information about the 
“borrower”, but rather on the obligor (Klapper, 2006). Under a factoring contract, the factor 
purchases the seller's accounts receivable, with or without recourse, and assumes the 
responsibility to collect repayments. Originally limited to domestic contracts, international 
factoring has become popular as it eases the credit and collection burden created by 
international sales for exporters.  Like leasing companies, factoring companies can only 
function with a legal framework governing these transactions, but they rely to a lesser extent 
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on the contractual framework of a country, so that they can help push a financial system 
towards the frontier of SME lending, even if this frontier is low.  
A second important area is financial innovation, which includes new players and new 
products. While financial innovation has obtained a bad reputation in many developed 
financial systems, Africa critically depends on innovative activity by existing and new 
financial institutions. Transaction-based lending to SMEs can be seen as one such innovation. 
Other innovations include psychometric assessments as a viable low-cost, automated 
screening tool to identify high-potential entrepreneurs and evaluate risk and future potential, 
which have proven very successful in initial pilots in South Africa and other countries. 
Complementing credit services with other “extension-type” services, such as business 
development or entrepreneurial training can also be helpful. In general, taking a page from 
the microfinance lending manual might prove helpful in approaching smaller firms, which 
face not only financing but an array of other business constraints.  
It is important to note that financial innovation does not arise by itself, but is a 
consequence of a competitive financial system with regulation that is not overly burdensome. 
It requires an open and flexible regulatory and supervisory approach that balances the need 
for financial innovation with the need to watch for fragility emerging in new forms. Such an 
approach has to take into account the unexpectedness of innovation, in terms of needs, 
technical possibilities and origin.  
Throughout most of the paper, we have focused on bank financing, as Africa’s 
financial systems are heavily bank-based, in line with its level of economic and financial 
development and the small size of most financial systems on the continent.  However, new 
providers, techniques and products might as well come from outside the banking system and 
bring competitive pressures on incumbent banks. Leasing and factoring, two financing 
techniques mentioned above, can be offered by banks, but also by specialized non-bank 
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financial institutions.  Further, one important constraint on bank finance is the lack of equity 
in enterprises. High leverage can prevent enterprises from pursuing more debt, so that lack of 
equity rather than lack of debt is the binding constraint. On a more general level, equity can 
be a potentially beneficial financing source for enterprises in their early years and for 
enterprises with a high risk profile.  On the other hand, there are few if any instruments and 
vehicles for equity finance available in most African countries. Increasingly, there are some 
equity funds across Africa that specialize in SMEs.  Business Partners International (BPI) 
Kenya SME Fund is a private fixed-life fund established in 2006, which invests in equity, 
quasi-equity and debt of Kenyan SMEs and has been very successful, ultimately attracting 
external financing from donors and private sources. There are several Aureos Capital Funds, 
focusing on East, West and South Africa, respectively, set up with support from donors.   
A fourth important topic concerns a more granular analysis of SMEs. It is important to 
distinguish between segments within this group of enterprises that have different financing 
needs and profiles. A large share of enterprises in Africa consists of informal 
microenterprises whose establishment is often the result of a lack of alternative economic 
opportunities.  Not being able to produce formal financial accounts or formal guarantees, it is 
hard to see this segment of the enterprise population becoming bankable over the medium- to 
long-term, at least not for credit services. They seem a natural target group for microcredit 
institutions and rely more heavily than other enterprises on informal finance providers.  A 
second segment is medium-sized enterprises, often well established and often export-oriented 
companies. In most cases they have access to bank finance, but struggle to get access to 
equity finance, including through financial markets. Finally, there are small formal 
enterprises, some of which might have high growth potential.   These firms – often also 
referred to as the missing middle – are usually too big for microfinance institutions, but not 
24 
 
formal or established enough for banks. It is especially this last segment that seems to be 
affected by shallow financial markets.   
Another important distinction, partly overlapping with the size distinction is that 
between subsistence or lifestyle entrepreneurs and transformational entrepreneurs. Many of 
the subsistence or lifestyle enterprises are set up out of lack of alternative employment 
options for the owner in the formal sector. They rely almost exclusively on the owner, maybe 
with support from family members and/or friends. Very different from these subsistence 
entrepreneurs are transformational entrepreneurs, who are often leading larger enterprises that 
create jobs, while microfinance clients are only rarely of the transformational kind. For long-
term effects on aggregate growth and job creation, a stronger focus on transformational 
enterprises is therefore needed. 5 
The distinction between subsistence and transformational entrepreneurs is also 
important when assessing the impact of policy reforms. Bruhn (2013), for example, finds that 
easing the process of business registration in Mexico led to an increase of business 
registration among entrepreneurial types, but a decrease among wage earner type 
entrepreneurs who were rather more likely to become wage earners after the reform.6 
Similarly, Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier and Pages (2009) show that the distinction between 
small and micro-enterprises can be a very important one. Using enterprise survey data across 
90 countries, they show that small firms with more than 10 employees are negatively affected 
by an adverse business environment to a larger extent than micro-enterprises with fewer than 
10 employees. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Among transformational enterprises, there is often a further emphasis on “gazelles”, enterprises with 
exceptionally high growth rates over longer periods.  
6
 These differential effects are similar to recent work in the area of microfinance, where different effects of 
access to credit have been documented depending on the characteristics of the borrower (entrepreneurial type or 
not). See, for example, Banerjee et al. (2009).  
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5. Conclusions and looking forward  
This paper documented firm and country covariates of SMEs’ access to finance across 
Africa.  We showed that enterprises in Africa are less likely to have a loan than in other 
developing regions of the world.  While many of the firm and country covariates explaining 
access to bank financing are similar inside and outside Africa, we also find some interesting 
differences.  
We also pointed to continuing and new challenges in the SME financing space in 
Africa. In this concluding section, we discuss the implications for research.   Over the past 
decade, an array of new data sources has enabled more rigorous research into SMEs’ 
operational and growth obstacles. In addition to aggregate financial sector indicators, the 
Enterprise Survey Data we have drawn on heavily in this paper have enabled a more granular 
look by allowing for differentiation between firms of different size, age, ownership and 
geographic location. More recently, these surveys have also been undertaken as panels, i.e. 
with the same firms being surveyed in subsequent waves, rather than as repeated cross-
sectional surveys, which provides additional insights and allows additional hypothesis testing. 
Country-specific surveys of SMEs undertaken in, among others, South Africa and Kenya that 
focus on financing issues can provide additional insights.  As in other regions, bank-level 
surveys that provide insights into banks’ operating constraints in specific markets and their 
lending techniques are becoming more popular and can provide additional important 
information, as for example reported by Berg and Fuchs (2013).7  As credit registries are 
being established and collecting an increasing amount of information on borrowers and loans, 
this information can be a critical input into research, as is being done for other low- and 
middle-income countries. These additional, micro-level databases will thus provide an 
                                                          
7
 This is similar to a cross-country survey undertaken by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2011), 
country-specific suƌveys as ƌepoƌted iŶ De la Toƌƌe, MaƌtiŶez Peƌia aŶd Schŵukleƌ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ, aŶd the EBRD’s BaŶk 
Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) for the former transition economies. 
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important impetus for further research.  They can enable assessments of different lending 
techniques, delivery channels and organizational structures conducive to small business 
lending. They can also be used to gauge the impact of specific interventions or policy 
reforms.  
A second important area is that of entrepreneurship.  Behind the growth of firms are 
individuals with different levels of motivation, education and management skills.  
Understanding the characteristics of successful entrepreneurs, and the effects of social 
networks and education, is important.  The gender issue has also become an increasing focus, 
with research moving beyond simple gender comparisons to exploring different socio-
economic and psychological characteristics of female and male entrepreneurs, e.g. risk 
aversion, and their effects on access to and use of financial services and entrepreneurial 
performance.  Another important area, connected to entrepreneurship, relates directly to 
behavioral economics. Experimental economics can give important insights into issues such 
as cooperation between entrepreneurs and network building.   
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Table 2 
     
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has a bank loan. P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level respectively. All models are estimated via Probit model (reporting marginal effects). All models include Sector 1-15 control dummies (model 1 includes 
country dummies as well) although we do not present them to conserve space. Standards errors allow for clustering at the country level. In regional dummies, we are omitting 
Latin America and the Caribbean category. Foreign- and government-owned are dummy variables indicating foreign or government participation in ownership. Log of age is 
log of years since establishment.  Small and medium size are dummies indicating firms with fewer than 20 and between 20 and 99 employees, respectively. Female manager 
indicates that the main manager of the firm is female. Partnership, Private (but not partnership or sole proprietorship), Sole (proprietorship) and Public (listed) are dummy 
variables indicating the legal status of the firm. The log of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is measured in USD and population density is midyear population divided 
by land area in square kilometres.   
Dependent variable   Loan 
    Basic 
No country FE 
Add Africa 
dummy 
No country FE 
Add Africa 
dummy, 
regional 
dummies, 
and country 
features 
No country FE 
Add Africa 
dummy, 
regional 
dummies, 
and country 
features and 
interactions 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm  
Foreign owned  -0.0848*** -0.0619*** -0.0806*** -0.1057*** 
 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Government owned  -0.0345* -0.0781*** -0.0726* -0.0809** 
 
[0.100] [0.006] [0.081] [0.042] 
Log of Age 0.0159*** 0.0369*** 0.0195** 0.014 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.021] [0.182] 
Small size -0.3073*** -0.2986*** -0.2929*** -0.2968*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Medium size -0.1388*** -0.1317*** -0.1267*** -0.1281*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female manager -0.015 -0.017 -0.0075 -0.0221 
 
[0.162] [0.509] [0.647] [0.200] 
Partnership -0.014 -0.0875* -0.0576* -0.0428 
 
[0.585] [0.052] [0.077] [0.287] 
Private 0.0275 0.0039 0.0233 0.0478* 
 
[0.214] [0.902] [0.323] [0.067] 
Sole -0.0305 -0.1072*** -0.0829*** -0.0306 
 
[0.203] [0.002] [0.006] [0.365] 
Public -0.0148 -0.0889*** -0.0674** -0.0481 
 
[0.634] [0.003] [0.044] [0.196] 
Regional dummies 
Africa   -0.1898*** -0.2257*** -0.1742* 
  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.056] 
East Asia and Pacific  
  
-0.082 -0.0911 
   
[0.170] [0.130] 
Europe and Central Asia 
  
-0.0822* -0.0834* 
   
[0.080] [0.082] 
Middle East and North Africa 
  
-0.3068*** -0.3154*** 
   
[0.000] [0.000] 
South Asia 
  
-0.1838** -0.1940** 
   
[0.049] [0.030] 
Country features 
Log of  GNI per capita     0.0294 0.028 
   
[0.134] [0.152] 
Population density (%) 
  
0.0003** 0.0003** 
      [0.037] [0.019] 
Interactions (Firm*Africa)  
Foreign owned  * Africa  
   
0.0765** 
    
[0.011] 
Government owned  * Africa  
   
0.0884 
    
[0.156] 
Log of Age * Africa  
   
0.0125 
    
[0.410] 
Small size * Africa  
   
0.0099 
    
[0.771] 
Medium size * Africa  
   
-0.004 
    
[0.904] 
Female manager * Africa  
   
0.1095*** 
    
[0.005] 
Partnership * Africa  
   
-0.0737 
    
[0.275] 
Private * Africa  
   
-0.0874* 
    
[0.088] 
Sole * Africa  
   
-0.1639*** 
    
[0.004] 
Public * Africa  
   
-0.0272 
        [0.685] 
Observations   63222 63222 58871 58871 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.187 0.112 0.136 0.138 
Number of countries 
 
109 109 109 109 
Number of African countries 
 
41 41 41 41 
Country Fixed Effects   Yes No No No 
Sector Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Banking sector variable im the 
regression   Basic 
No country FE 
Add Africa 
dummy 
No country FE 
Add Africa 
dummy, 
regional 
dummies, 
and country 
features 
No country FE 
Add Africa 
dummy, 
regional 
dummies, 
and country 
features and 
interactions 
Testing the coefficients of H0s listed below (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign owned  + Foreign*Africa 
=0  
   
[0.129] 
Government owned + 
Govt*Africa =0  
   
[0.957] 
Log of Age + Log of Age*Africa 
=0  
   
[0.022] 
Small size + Small*Africa =0 
 
   
[0.000] 
Medium size + Medium*Africa =0 
 
   
[0.000] 
Female manager + Female*Africa 
=0  
   
[0.013] 
Partnership + Partnership*Africa 
=0  
   
[0.032] 
Private + Private*Africa =0 
 
   
[0.355] 
Sole + Sole*Africa =0 
 
   
[0.000] 
Public + Public*Africa =0   
      
[0.164] 
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Table 3 
       
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has a bank loan. P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. All models are estimated via Probit model (reporting marginal effects). All models include Sector 1-15 control dummies although we do not present them to conserve space. 
Standards errors allow for clustering at the country level. In regional dummies, we are omitting Latin America and the Caribbean category. Foreign- and government-owned are dummy variables 
indicating foreign or government participation in ownership. Log of age is log of years since establishment.  Small and medium size are dummies indicating firms with fewer than 20 and between 
20 and 99 employees, respectively. Female manager indicates that the main manager of the firm is female. Partnership, Private (but not partnership or sole proprietorship), Sole (proprietorship) 
and Public (listed) are dummy variables indicating the legal status of the firm. The log of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is measured in USD and population density is midyear 
population divided by land area in square kilometres.  Branches commercial banks (per 100,000 adults) is the most recent available value, and % of Foreign owned banks and % of Government 
owned banks are ) are the nearest available values to the year of the respective enterprise survey.  Bank concentration is the assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial 
banks. Overhead costs is the average of overhead costs relative to total assets of all banks in a country and net interest margin is measured relative to total earning assets. 
Dependent variable   Loan 
Banking sector variable   
Branches, 
commercial 
banks (per 
100,000 adults 
) 
% of Foreign 
owned banks  
% of 
Government 
owned banks 
Concentration Overhead costs / Assets ratio 
Net Interest 
Margin 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm  
Foreign owned  -0.1005*** -0.0956*** -0.0983*** -0.1095*** -0.1074*** -0.1071*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Government owned  -0.0258 -0.0988** -0.0911* -0.0669** -0.0830** -0.0667* 
 
[0.593] [0.037] [0.063] [0.045] [0.034] [0.064] 
Log of Age 0.0226 0.0137 0.0146 0.0134 0.0128 0.0099 
 
[0.102] [0.219] [0.178] [0.194] [0.232] [0.240] 
Small size -0.3019*** -0.2981*** -0.2994*** -0.2983*** -0.2999*** -0.2980*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Medium size -0.1289*** -0.1264*** -0.1266*** -0.1302*** -0.1296*** -0.1299*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female manager -0.0061 -0.0410*** -0.0357** -0.0206 -0.0235 -0.0269* 
 
[0.745] [0.006] [0.035] [0.221] [0.161] [0.066] 
Partnership -0.0228 -0.0727 -0.0765 -0.0514 -0.0432 -0.0257 
 
[0.649] [0.122] [0.115] [0.239] [0.294] [0.552] 
Private 0.0642** 0.0374 0.0394 0.0537** 0.0519* 0.0518* 
 
[0.042] [0.213] [0.181] [0.035] [0.051] [0.057] 
Sole -0.0468 -0.0098 -0.0138 -0.0376 -0.0231 -0.0137 
 
[0.169] [0.800] [0.727] [0.276] [0.504] [0.685] 
Public -0.0054 -0.0548 -0.0547 -0.0469 -0.041 -0.0461 
 
[0.875] [0.207] [0.203] [0.218] [0.300] [0.249] 
Regional dummies 
Africa -0.0773 -0.1484 -0.1528 -0.1702* -0.1747* -0.2278*** 
 
[0.566] [0.154] [0.130] [0.060] [0.057] [0.004] 
East Asia and Pacific  -0.0416 -0.1406** -0.1273** -0.1045* -0.0867 -0.1416*** 
 
[0.634] [0.013] [0.013] [0.099] [0.174] [0.008] 
Europe and Central Asia -0.0622 -0.0601 -0.0638 -0.0709 -0.0717 -0.0990** 
 
[0.386] [0.270] [0.221] [0.141] [0.147] [0.015] 
Middle East and North Africa -0.2847*** 
  
-0.3197*** -0.3196*** -0.3406*** 
 
[0.000] 
  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
South Asia -0.3081*** -0.1438 -0.1169 -0.2199** -0.1953** -0.2337*** 
 
[0.000] [0.110] [0.262] [0.011] [0.029] [0.006] 
Country features 
Log of  GNI per capita 0.0409* 0.0315 0.032 0.0222 0.0278 0.0054 
 
[0.094] [0.133] [0.194] [0.264] [0.160] [0.820] 
Population density (%) 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0003** 
  [0.030] [0.242] [0.318] [0.001] [0.037] [0.016] 
Interactions (Firm*Africa)  
Foreign owned  * Africa  0.0317 0.0791** 0.0710** 0.0794*** 0.0779** 0.0838*** 
 
[0.272] [0.010] [0.031] [0.009] [0.010] [0.003] 
Government owned  * Africa  0.0191 0.122 0.1145 0.054 0.0931 0.0832 
 
[0.789] [0.127] [0.163] [0.380] [0.134] [0.148] 
Log of Age * Africa  0.0138 0.0083 0.0064 0.0137 0.014 0.0188 
 
[0.434] [0.635] [0.710] [0.380] [0.363] [0.140] 
Small size * Africa  0.0355 0.0101 0.0025 0.0087 0.0139 0.0186 
 
[0.454] [0.782] [0.949] [0.803] [0.687] [0.590] 
Medium size * Africa  -0.0032 -0.0097 -0.0158 -0.0049 -0.0041 -0.0019 
 
[0.946] [0.796] [0.685] [0.887] [0.901] [0.953] 
Female manager * Africa  0.0625 0.1375*** 0.1302*** 0.1073*** 0.1132*** 0.1099*** 
 
[0.104] [0.002] [0.007] [0.009] [0.004] [0.004] 
Partnership * Africa  -0.0597 -0.0635 -0.0511 -0.0761 -0.0742 -0.0535 
 
[0.537] [0.425] [0.537] [0.284] [0.279] [0.446] 
Private * Africa  -0.0965 -0.0839 -0.0828 -0.1037** -0.0912* -0.069 
 
[0.286] [0.165] [0.175] [0.044] [0.077] [0.205] 
Sole * Africa  -0.1302 -0.2028*** -0.1891*** -0.1709*** -0.1701*** -0.1599*** 
 
[0.128] [0.001] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] 
Public * Africa  -0.0957 -0.0597 -0.0546 -0.0341 -0.0345 0.0019 
  [0.229] [0.427] [0.473] [0.617] [0.614] [0.978] 
Banking sector variables 
Branches (per 100,000 adults ) 0.0018           
 
[0.258] 
     % of Foreign owned banks (%) 
 
-0.0006 
    
  
[0.514] 
    % of Government owned banks (%) 
  
-0.0007 
   
   
[0.496] 
   Concentration (%) 
   
0.0011 
  
    
[0.284] 
  Overhead costs / Assets ratio (%) 
    
-0.0013** 
 
     
[0.014] 
 Net Interest Margin (%) 
     
-0.0194** 
      
[0.046] 
Observations   36588 47975 47861 54700 57756 57756 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.134 0.131 0.131 0.139 0.138 0.144 
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Number of countries 
 
59 75 74 88 102 102 
Number of African countries 
 
21 28 28 34 39 39 
Country Fixed Effects   No No No No No No 
Sector Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
              
 
       
Banking sector variable im the 
regression   
Branches, 
commercial 
banks (per 
100,000 adults 
) 
% of Foreign 
owned banks  
% of 
Government 
owned banks 
Concentration Overhead costs / Assets ratio 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Testing the coefficients of H0s listed below (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign owned  + Foreign*Africa 
=0  [0.000] [0.472] [0.238] [0.119] [0.124] [0.206] 
Government owned + 
Govt*Africa =0  [0.894] [0.785] [0.769] [0.744] [0.919] [0.770] 
Log of Age + Log of Age*Africa 
=0  [0.003] [0.114] [0.125] [0.025] [0.021] [0.005] 
Small size + Small*Africa =0 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Medium size + Medium*Africa =0 
 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Female manager + Female*Africa 
=0  [0.102] [0.033] [0.033] [0.019] [0.012] [0.020] 
Partnership + Partnership*Africa 
=0  [0.323] [0.039] [0.052] [0.025] [0.033] [0.162] 
Private + Private*Africa =0 
 
[0.682] [0.365] [0.410] [0.250] [0.360] [0.703] 
Sole + Sole*Africa =0 
 
[0.027] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Public + Public*Africa =0   [0.166] [0.064] [0.078] [0.145] [0.167] [0.413] 
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Table 4 
 
  
  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has a bank loan. P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level respectively. All models are estimated via Probit model (reporting marginal effects). All models include Sector 1-15 control dummies,  Firm characteristics, other Regional 
dummies, Country features and Interactions of Firm characteristics & Africa, although we do not present them to conserve space. Standards errors allow for clustering at the country 
level. In regional dummies, we are omitting Latin America and the Caribbean category.  Foreign- and government-owned are dummy variables indicating foreign or government 
participation in ownership. Log of age is log of years since establishment.  Small and medium size are dummies indicating firms with fewer than 20 and between 20 and 99 
employees, respectively. Female manager indicates that the main manager of the firm is female. Partnership, Private (but not partnership or sole proprietorship), Sole 
(proprietorship) and Public (listed) are dummy variables indicating the legal status of the firm. The log of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is measured in USD and 
population density is midyear population divided by land area in square kilometres.  Overhead costs is the average of overhead costs relative to total assets of all banks in a country 
and net interest margin is measured relative to total earning assets. 
Dependent Variable Loan 
  
 
Banking sector var Overhead costs / Assets ratio 
Net Interest 
Margin 
  
 
    (1) (2) 
  
 
Africa 
Africa -0.1795* -0.3505*** 
 
 
 
  [0.066] [0.000] 
 
 
 
Size  
Small size -0.2822*** -0.3117*** 
 
 
 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
 
 
 
Medium size -0.1197*** -0.1351*** 
 
 
 
  [0.000] [0.000] 
 
 
 
Banking sector 
Overhead costs / Assets (%) 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.812] 
 
 
 
 
Net Interest Margin (%) 
 
-0.0250** 
 
 
 
  
  [0.029] 
 
 
 
Banking 
sector 
* 
Size 
Overhead costs / Assets * Small -0.0028*** 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
 
 
 
Overhead costs / Assets * Medium -0.0013*** 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.000] 
 
 
 
 
Net Interest Margin * Small 
 
0.003 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.549] 
 
 
 
Net Interest Margin * Medium 
 
0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.694] 
 
 
 
Size  
*  
Africa 
Small * Africa dummy 0.028 0.078 
 
 
 
 
[0.672] [0.301] 
 
 
 
Medium * Africa dummy 0.037 0.077 
 
 
 
  
[0.517] [0.222] 
 
 
 
Banking sector 
*  
Africa 
Overhead costs / Assets * Africa 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.969] 
 
 
 
 
Net Interest Margin * Africa 
 
0.0285*** 
 
 
 
  
  [0.007] 
 
 
 
Banking sector 
*  
Size 
*  
Africa 
Overhead costs / Assets * Small * Africa -0.003 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.762] 
 
 
 
 
Overhead costs / Assets * Medium * Africa -0.008 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.334] 
 
 
 
 
Net Interest Margin * Small * Africa 
 
-0.010 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.298] 
 
 
 
Net Interest Margin * Medium * Africa 
 
-0.012 
 
 
 
  
  [0.146] 
 
 
 
Observations 57756 57756 
  
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.139 0.146 
  
 
Number of countries 102 102 
  
 
Number of African countries 39 39 
  
 
Country Fixed Effects No No 
  
 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
  
 
    
  
 
  
  
  
 
Banking sector variable Overhead costs / Assets ratio 
Net Interest 
Margin 
  
 
Testing the coefficients of H0s listed below (1) (2) 
  
 
Overhead   + Overhead*Small =0 [0.001] 
 
   Overhead   + Overhead*Medium =0 [0.008] 
 
  
 
Net Interest Margin   + Net Interest Margin*Small =0 
 
[0.024] 
   Net Interest Margin   + Net Interest Margin*Medium =0 
 
[0.024] 
  
 
Small + Small*Africa =0 [0.000] [0.000] 
   Medium + Medium*Africa =0 [0.111] [0.282] 
  
 
Overhead   + Overhead *Africa =0 [0.959] 
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Net Interest Margin   + Net Interest Margin *Africa =0 
 
[0.636] 
  
 
Overhead  *Small + Overhead*Small*Africa =0 [0.543] 
 
   Overhead  *Medium + Overhead*Medium*Africa =0 [0.259] 
 
  
 
Net Interest Margin  *Small + Net Interest Margin*Small*Africa =0 
 
[0.394] 
   Net Interest Margin  *Medium + Net Interest Margin*Medium*Africa =0   [0.159] 
   
 
